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1989, it is nonetheless worrying in that it deepens 
the chasm between Russia and its Western partners, 
with no positive outcome in sight. Russia appears to 
be diplomatically more isolated than before and its 
economy, already stagnant and fragile, has taken a hit. 
In March, the World Bank warned that Russia’s economy 
could shrink 1.8% if the crisis escalated, down from a 
projected growth of 2.2% in December3. This is added to 
the massive capital outflow as foreign investors worry 
about the investment climate in an unpredictable and 
isolated Russia, as well as to the rising inflation and 
diving rubble, hurting the Russian economic, financial 
and banking sector4. And things might get even worse 
if new American and European sanctions are taken, 
this time targeting Russia’s economy rather than only 
a few select individuals. These sanctions are still a ways 
off but could provide a real bite to the West’s current 
bark if the crisis should persist.
Indeed, this could happen sooner rather than later as 
the situation shows no signs of a much-needed de-
escalation. The latest developments in Ukraine are 
particularly worrying. The provisional government in 
Kiev is facing a perilous set of circumstances, with a 
chunk of its territory (albeit a poor and troubled one) 
gone, its economy in tatters, a hostile neighbour to 
the East and timid partners in the West. On top of this, 
it must now face serious challenges to its authority 
as new opposition movements pop up in the Eastern 
regions, particularly in Luhansk, Kharkiv and Donetsk. In 
Kharkiv, Ukraine’s security services, the SBU, managed 
to evacuate a couple of government buildings seized 
by armed pro-Russian activists5 while in Donetsk, a 
few hundred pro-Russian separatists have occupied 
the main administration building and proclaimed a 
sovereign “People’s Republic of Donetsk”. They now 
hunker down in the building, strengthening their 
3 http://rt.com/business/world-bank-russia-2014-369/ 
4http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/24/uk-russia-economy-idUKBRE-
A2N13S20140324 
5http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-lavrov-legitimize-nato-satellite-build-
up/25329493.html 
On March 21st, the Russian Federation formally 
welcomed a new entity in its midst, integrating the 
Crimean Autonomous Republic and detaching it from 
Ukraine. The ways in which this annexation took place 
laid bare the Russian leadership’s expansive ambitions 
in the post-Soviet space and left it open to widespread 
criticism from most of the international community. 
On March 27th, a resolution proposed by Ukraine at the 
UN General Assembly condemning Russia’s action was 
approved by 100 countries, leaving only 11 states to 
side with Russia with another 58 choosing to abstain 
and the rest being absent from the proceedings. This 
vote was seen in the West as proof of Russia’s growing 
isolation, while Moscow chose to downplay this view, 
arguing that the votes in favour of the resolution 
were obtained by Western pressure: Russia’s UN 
ambassador, Vitaly Churkin stated “We know that our 
Western partners used their routine practice when 
they addressed countries, say, African or Asian. They 
put it quite straight: ‘We are providing economic aid to 
you. You enjoy these or those preferences in relations 
with us, so you must vote in favor of this resolution.’”. 
He added: “we never use such methods”1. 
Leaving aside this last misrepresentation2, Russia’s 
actions since the start of the crisis in Crimea, at the end 
of February, has kicked off a new era of confrontation 
between East and West. This crisis is arguably the 
worst since the end of the Cold War and, if it does not 
mean a return to the bipolar confrontation of 1948-
1 http://rt.com/news/russia-us-churkin-relations-745/ 
2 Russia is notorious for exerting pressure to reach its foreign policy goals. 
This policy of hard and soft coercion is visible in the many instances in which 
it uses its energy resources to leverage political influence, by agreeing to sell 
gas at a premium rate to its allies while regularly raising its price tag of de-
liveries to less friendly neighbours, Ukraine being a case in point. Another 
instance of Russian pressure can be seen in the choice made by Armenia, in 
September 2013, to forgo signing an Association Agreement with the EU, pre-
ferring to join the Russian-led Eurasian Union in the near future. This decision 
was criticised in Armenia and in Europe, perceived to be the direct result of 
Russian threats to sell military equipment to Azerbaijan if Erevan chose to 
follow a European route (Armenia and Azerbaijan are in a state of latent war 
since 1992). http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-russia-customs-union-eu-
analysys/25095948.html  
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barricades in case of an armed response by the security 
forces6. The standoff has been going on since Monday, 
April 7th, with no clear end in sight. The separatists and 
self-proclaimed “people’s representatives” plan to 
hold a referendum on month from now, on May 11th, in 
order to decide the region’s future, or rather, hoping 
to join Russia like their Crimean brethren did. 
However, the situation in Donetsk is not a clear replica 
of the Crimean scenario and leaves some room for 
optimism. First, unlike in Crimea, there are no Russian 
boots on the ground in Donetsk (even without any 
official insignia). The separatists are determined but 
are not strong enough to pose an existential threat 
to Ukraine’s Eastern region. Moreover, the East’s 
geography does not lend itself to a quick land grab the 
way Crimea did. Indeed, the peninsula’s distinct shape 
meant that external military forces – i.e. Russia – could 
rapidly deploy and cut off contact between Crimea 
and the mainland so as to create a new reality on the 
ground. In comparison, Donetsk and the East do not 
lend themselves to such a strategy and, if a military 
incursion happens, it will be slower – and bloodier – 
than in Crimea. A second note of relative optimism is 
that, in Donetsk, the pro-Russian stance is not as clear-
cut as it was in the Crimea. The East of Ukraine as a 
whole has a majority of Russian-speaking population, 
but fluency in a language does not necessarily translate 
to political support. In February 2014, a poll by the Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology found that only a 
third of the inhabitants of the Donetsk oblast wanted 
to be integrated in the Russian state. The same poll 
shows that in the East and the South, only 20-25% of 
the population want to unite with Russia. The majority 
(60-70%) would prefer to see Ukraine and Russia as 
independent but friendly neighbours7. In Crimea, the 
proportion of people wanting to join Russia in February 
2014 was 40%, a far cry from the results of the March 
referendum, but a significant difference nonetheless. 
Events show that a focused (and one-sided) media 
campaign by the Russian media can rapidly change 
opinions but, for now, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the people of Donetsk and the East would really 
want to be annexed by their neighbour. Third and final 
thought, the Crimean success was achieved in large 
part by speed and surprise. In a few days, unidentified 
Russian troops were deployed throughout the 
peninsula, creating a fait accompli and leaving no 
chance for Kiev to react, barring a doomed military 
reaction. No such surprise is possible in Donetsk as 
the whole world is watching with bated breath the 
situation in Ukraine. In this context of heightened 
scrutiny, it would be hard to replicate the “Crimean 
gambit” in Donetsk.
Does this mean that things are looking up and the 
situation is bound to resolve itself peacefully? Not 
necessarily. If the crisis in Donetsk is not of the same 
magnitude as the one in Crimea, it still remains worrying 
for Ukraine and regional stability as a whole. First, 
because the government in Kiev seems incapable of 
6 http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-dontesk-dispatch-separatists/25325883.
html 
7 http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=236&page=1 
dealing with the situation. Authorities have promised 
amnesty to all protesters who surrendered, as well 
as acknowledging the need to grant more powers to 
the different regions of the country8. They have also 
threatened to use force if the stalemate persists9, with 
their ultimatum rapidly coming to an end10. But this 
threat rings hollow as Kiev is reluctant to make a move 
which might be deemed provocative by Moscow, 
whilst the loyalty of security forces in Donetsk is called 
in question. Indeed, up to now, the police have acted 
“more as observers than as actors”, sometimes openly 
displaying their pro-Russian tendencies11. This lingering 
uncertainty is exacerbated by the second and main 
cause for worry: Russia’s (re)action. So far Moscow has 
not weighed in the situation in Donetsk but it remains 
a central preoccupation. The pro-Russian separatists 
are encouraged, at least indirectly, by Russian policy. 
Moscow organised the Crimean secession before 
annexing it, it has defended a forceful policy of 
intervention in any region where its “compatriots” 
(read: Russian speakers) are endangered and the law 
authorizing the use of force in the whole of Ukraine is 
still in effect12. Furthermore, NATO warns of a massive 
military build-up near the Ukrainian border, which could 
be used to rapidly and decisively intervene in Ukraine 
if needed13. Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister 
has stressed that there would be no more takeover of 
Ukrainian territory calling instead for a federalisation 
and neutralisation of Ukraine14. Is Russia’s show of 
force only a bargaining chip to push Kiev towards the 
federal solution? It seems to be, at least at first glance. 
Russian objectives regarding Ukraine are not to annex 
the whole country but to maintain it firmly under its 
influence. A deep federalisation, as it is proposed by 
Moscow, would serve that purpose, by weakening the 
central government and giving enough freedom to 
the regions to ensure their economic sovereignty and 
their choice of international partners. If the Eastern 
regions of Ukraine, richer and more industrialised than 
the western part, are permitted to join Russia’s orbit, 
it would amount to the creation of a constitutionally 
approved protectorate for Moscow. The use of force 
would then be unnecessary. 
It is still too early to predict the end of the Ukrainian 
crisis for now, but it could go either way. The Ukrainian 
authorities could decide not to give in to Russian 
pressures and call Russia’s bluff by intervening in the 
East and forcefully evacuating the protesters. In order 
to do this, it would need to make sure of the police’s 
loyalty in those regions, bringing in troops from the 
western part if necessary. If Russia is indeed bluffing 
8 http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-lavrov-legitimize-nato-satellite-build-
up/25329493.html 
9 http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-turchynov-offers-amnesty/25328000.
html 
10 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26953113 
11http:/ /www.rferl .org/content/ukraine-dontesk-dispatch-separa-
tists/25325883.html 
12 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035 
13http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/10/ukraine-crisis-nato-images-
idUSL6N0N24CC20140410 
14 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/497930.html 
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and does not react, this could be the beginning of 
the end of the crisis. Ukraine would still lose Crimea, 
but it would have stood up to Russia and would have 
– for now – escaped its orbit. On the other hand, if 
Russia is prepared to use military force to reach her 
strategic objectives, it could seize the opportunity of 
a crackdown in Donetsk to enter Ukrainian territory 
on the pretext of “defending its compatriots”. This 
would lead to a general war between Russia and 
Ukraine, which would be bloody and costly. It would 
also mean a real freeze in relations between Russia 
and the West, leading to more sanctions as well as 
political and economic isolation for Russia. Another 
possible scenario is that the authorities in Kiev give in. 
They accept a federal solution which would mean the 
end of a real Ukrainian sovereignty leaving in place a 
weak and neutralised country, easy prey for continued 
Russian influence. This outcome would probably leave 
the West feeling good about itself, having found a 
peaceful way out of the crisis. After a time, relations 
with Russia would restart on a more positive note and 
the problem in Ukraine will be forgotten by all. Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia would be the clear winner in that case 
and would no doubt fell emboldened to use force, or 
the threat of it, in future situations. 
It is still too early to see which scenario will play out, 
the next few days and the situation in Donetsk will be 
crucial. If nothing is resolved before the date for the 
planned referendum, things will be probably heat up 
again. Another important juncture will be the Ukrainian 
presidential elections of May 25th. No one knows what 
will happen until then, but Russian reaction to the vote 
will probably be a useful indicator of the Kremlin’s 
further aims and posture. If it recognizes the elections 
as legitimate, it will mean it is ready for a peaceful de-
escalation. However, it could also seize the opportunity 
to foment more trouble in the East, denouncing the 
so-called “neo-nazis” in Kiev as a pretext for further 
intervention. Springtime in Ukraine is bound to remain 
hot.
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